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"THE UNCONSCIOUS IS A JURIST":
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND LAW IN THE WORK OF
PIERRE LEGENDRE
PETER GOODRICH•
Prologue

On Friday the fourth of May, 1984, while watching the Prime
Minister of Quebec speaking on television, a disaffected young corporal
in the Canadian army formed the idea of massacring the government
of Quebec. Denis Lortie subsequently described this initial impulse in
terms of a desire to attack the national Assembly and eliminate the
ruling Parti quebequois, a party which had "done harm to the French
language." He would thus "destroy something which wanted to destroy
the French language." In various other formulations, Lortie expressed
a wish to save the language by killing the government: "I will do some
harm so as to do some good." 1
Sometime earlier, at the end of April, Lortie had applied for leave
from his base in Ottawa. Claiming that he wanted to see his wife, he
had tried to negotiate a leave of three days from his immediate
superior, Sergeant Chenier. His request was refused and Lortie
subsequently admitted that during the course of his application being
refused, something strange had happened: he had seen the face of his
father standing opposite him in the guise of Sergeant Chenier.
Lortie, however, was granted one day of leave, for Monday the
seventh of May. On Saturday the fifth of May he conducted an
inventory of the arsenal at the base and checked out his exercise gear,
including his rifle, his gas mask and a first-aid kit. On Sunday the
sixth of May he drove to Quebec, checked into a motel and
reconnoitered the Citadel looking for a place to kill and to be killed. On
Monday the seventh he visited the national Assembly building with a
tour group and then purchased a dictaphone and three cassettes.
Sometime later that day, Lortie recorded three separate messages on
these tapes announcing his murderous plans and his own imminent

• Birkbeck College, University of London.
Pierre Legendre, LE CRIME DU CAPORAL LoRTIE: TRAin: SUR LE PERE 95 (Paris:
Fayard, 1989Xhereinafter, LoRTIE). For critical commentary on this work and on the case
of Lortie, see Alain Pottage, Crime and Culture: The Relevance of the Psychoanalytical,
55 Mod. L. Rev. 421 (1992); Marie.Jeanne Segers, Actualite de la pens~e de Pierre
Legendre, 27 Revue Interdisciplinaire D'~tudes Juridiques 99 (1991). The best
introduction to Legendre's work is Anton Schutz, Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath: Pierre
Legendre's Critique of Rational Law-Giving, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 979 (1995).
1
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death to his wife, the military Chaplain and a radio show host, M.
Arthur.
On the morning of Tuesday the eighth of May 1984, on the day
which "I knew internally was my lowest point, the day of my death,"2
Lortie put on his full military uniform and equipment, including his
revolver and his automatic rifle. Immaculately dressed, shoes polished,
uniform pressed and identity card in place he left the motel to do
battle. He posted the cassette to his wife. He then drove to the radio
station and delivered the tape intended for M. Arthur. He went next
to the Citadel and waited in the car, listening to the radio and
expecting his tape to be played. The interruption of the regular
broadcast by the playing of his tape was to be the signal for his attack
to begin. The tape was not played. Lortie panicked and left his car. He
first fired some shots at the entrance to the Citadel and then ran
towards the national Assembly building situated next to the Citadel.
Lortie entered the Assembly by a side door. First, he destroyed a red
emergency telephone which was used for internal security purposes,
and then fired at the receptionist while shouting at her to leave. Lortie
then ran down the corridors of the Assembly building firing at anyone
who crossed his path. He killed three people and injured eight before
arriving at the Chamber of Deputies-the Blue Room. As it happened,
on the day he had chosen for his attempt to "kill the government of
Quebec," the Assembly was not in session and the Chamber was
empty. Lortie went and sat down in the President's chair from where
he fired a volley of shots directly in front of him at a clock, and then
let off some further rounds to his left and his right directed at the
empty benches where the representatives would have sat.
Lortie was persuaded by a Sergeant at Arms to give up his
weapons and was subsequently arrested without being killed. When
asked by the Sergeant at Arms why he had acted as he had, Lortie
responded "I cannot tell you. It was not my heart but my head." While
waiting in the police station Lortie had another vision in which he saw
the face of an old man who mysteriously managed to make him
understand that he would be pardoned for all his transgressions.
Subsequently Lortie was tried, and during the course of
interrogation and direct examination a variety of incidental responses
throw a certain further light upon his crime. Lortie came from a family
of six. His father had been alcoholic, violently abusive of his mother
and of the children. The father also had an incestuous relationship
with Lortie's eldest sister. He had been in prison on several occasions
1

Legendre, LoRTIE, at 89.
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and left the family while Lortie was still quite young. At one point the
children had even banded together and hidden a number of weapons
in the house, vowing to kill the father the next time he became violent
with them. In replying to questions as to why he had committed the
crime, Lortie at one point talked of losing a battle "against an inner
negativity," a battle against a terrifying fear that he would become his
father. Even more remarkably, he stated sometime after being arrested
that "the government of Quebec had the face of my father." Elsewhere,
Lortie spoke of his crime in the following terms: "I felt capable of
destroying this authority, my strength was boundless ...s
A few final details need mentioning. In the tape which he sent to
his wife, Lortie declared his love for her ("my heart is yours, my head
is elsewhere"') and announced his intention to kill and to be killed. In
relation both to the murders and his own annihilation, Lortie stated
that he did not know why he would carry out these acts, he simply
knew that he must do them, that they were imperatives. It should be
noted also that this internal imperative to immolate himself and to
sacrifice others was mirrored in an external form. In addition to the
tape recordings of his intentions, the bulk of the events of May the
eighth were recorded on security cameras in the Assembly building
and were played back to Lortie both before and during the trial. He
found watching these images so terrifying and so intolerable that at
one point he fled the dock in tears and hammered his head on the
walls of his cell. He acknowledged at one juncture that "I had to see
them. It was the decision which I had to take. I had to pass through...."
At another point he responded by saying: "You know that I cannot say
that it is not me. It is me."5 The double negative represents what, with
only a minor injustice, might be termed an unconscious selfidentification, the attribution of an external or corporeal cause for
which the subject has yet to take responsibility.
The above sketch of corporal Lortie's crime does scant justice to
the detail of the case, nor does it attempt to reconstruct the political
and biographical contexts in which the events took place. The crime is
treated by the French psychoanalyst and jurist Pierre Legendre as an
exemplary one and becomes the focus of a study of the function or
structural place of the father, and of authority or more technically
'legitimacy,' in psychoanalysis and in law. The Lortie case in this sense
provides both a striking introduction to Legendre's work and an

3
Legendre, LoRTIE, at 61.
' Legendre, LoRTIE, at 95.
5
Legendre, LoRTIE, at 105.
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avenue for the exploration of the relation of the legal construction of
an institutional order to the familial constitution of the individual
subject. Certainly in the case of Lortie it seems fairly clear that the
boundaries between law and family, public and private, sociality and
intimacy are hardly distinct. They were rather intertwined, transgressed and blurred throughout the narrative of the murder and
during the course of its various reconstructions.
The extensive and expanding work of Pierre Legendre has been
concerned precisely with that interrelation of the unconscious and the
legal and has resolutely applied a Freudian model of analysis to the
history and the theory oflaw. His project can be depicted most directly
in legal historical terms as that of recovering a repressed poetics of
law. Using a startlingly varied corpus of Latin texts, Legendre
elaborates a theory of the subject's erotic attachment to power and a
corresponding aesthetics of submission to law. Questions of law are
always also questions of subjective attachment. They imply or address
a series of institutional subjects and can never be fully accounted
without attending to personal questions of motive and desire, fantasm
and truth. It is this fundamentally subjective and so in some measure
unconscious basis to the most objective of social practices which the
case of Lortie so graphically illustrates and to which Legendre's
philosophical project is so acutely attentive. The case of Lortie will
therefore be used throughout the ensuing elaboration of the connections and disparities that form the shared space of the disciplines of
psychoanalysis and law. At a more immediate level of persons rather
than disciplines, the contribution of psychoanalysis to law can be
phrased more simply as being that of the recognition of the
unconscious in the practice and interpretation of law. 6 In the hope of
avoiding too didactic an account of a project which is at times delirious,
at times poetic and on occasion closer to the medieval arts than to the

• On recent examples of the use of psychoanalysis in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
see Alain Pottage, Recreating Difference, 5 Law and Critique 131 (1994); David Caudill,
Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contour, of a Radical Socio-Legal P,ychoanaly,iB, 66
Ind. L. Rev. 651 (1991); David Caudill, Lacan and Law: Networking with the Big O[ther],
1 Studies in Psychoanalytic Theory 25 (1992); David Caudill, LA.CAN AND THE SUBJECT
OF LAW: TOWARD A PsYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Presa, 1997); Drucilla Cornell, "What Takes Place in the Dark,• in
TRANSFORMATIONS (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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conventions of contemporary jurisprudence,7 the ensuing reconstructions will be grouped around specific themes.
First, and most strikingly, psychoanalysis has long been perceived
as too threatening or too personal a form of knowledge to be addressed
directly in the study of law. Study of the unconscious, or
acknowledgment of the emotions, of the body and of its repressions or
hidden domains of desire have not figured greatly in the modern
theories of positive law. For the discipline of law, psychoanalysis has
remained a dark continent or 'China within.,s It threatens to disrupt
the complacent truths of modernist jurisprudence and so also to
question the rationality of legal practice by finally addressing the
unconscious of institutions, and correlatively the repetitions and
repressions, the drives and desires both of the authors and interpreters
of law as well as of its subjects. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that
although law is primarily concerned to judge the discourses and the
actions of natural and corporate subjects it has studiously avoided the
most radical of contemporary theories of the subject. In the first
instance, the work of a psychoanalytic jurisprudence is thus to
introduce the question of emotion and the domain of subjectivity into
the analysis of the institution and specifically of its law.
The introduction of a psychoanalytic perspective into the analysis
of law and of what Legendre terms its "capture of the subject" involves
the elaboration of a critical methodology for reading law. In Freudian
terms it involves a 'double reading,' an acknowledgment of a relation
between conscious and unconscious dimensions of the human subject
and so also of the texts of law. At the level of jurisprudence or the
theoretical analysis of law, this means a reading of the institution of
law 'as if' it were a subject and so driven to reproduce itself. Thus at
the level of method, Legendre has consistently used psychoanalysis to
develop a radical theory oflaw as a social subject ceaselessly labouring
to create subjects. In these terms psychoanalytical jurisprudence is in
the first instance a theory of law which seeks to understand the legal
order as the structural mechanism or social form of reproduction of

7
On the 'heavy semantics' and 'signifier-centered-textual strategy,' see Schiltz, Sons
of Writ, Sons of Wrath, supra note 1, at 990-991 (arguing that •Legendre... views what is
generally called explanation as merely some kind of side-effect of a suspect, questionable,
and ambiguous enterprise.... For Legendre, arguments are measured by their weight
rather than by their epistemological credentials or propositional consistency.")
• The expression is taken from Julia Kristeva, IN THE BEGINNING WAS LoVE:
PsYCHOANALYSIS AND FAITH 35 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987X•Is
psychoanalysis perhaps also our China within?").
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subjects. Law, for Legendre, is intrinsic to the formation of the
individual subject, and law is both historically and theoretically at the
centre of the symbolic order in relation to which individual identity is
formed. Where Lacan referred to the unconscious as being structured
like a language, Legendre adds that the unconscious acts like a jurist.
The second theme, which Legendre reiterates in varying contexts,
concerns the specific familial form of subjectivity, whether the subject
is an institution acting 'as if it were a natural subject or an individual.
If the unconscious, for Legendre, is a jurist then its legalism should be
understood in a dual sense. First, law determines the space of intimacy
or of subjectivity, it dictates in advance the familial places, the roles
and relationships, the 'familial fates' into which the subject is born. In
a second and more theoretical guise, Law in the sense of the
foundational social principle of authority is intrinsic to the symbolic
dimension of social relations, and forms the context or 'mirror' within
which identity is constructed in the institution. What is most striking
about Legendre's project of re-thinking law from a psychoanalytic
perspective is thus much less a question of the utility of psychoanalysis
in explaining features of the subjectivity of law than it is an instance
of reinscribing law in our understanding of the subject. In this sense
the case of Lortie is far more than an instance of the utility of
psychoanalysis in the explanation of the unconscious causes of a
subject's actions. The case of Lortie is rather a vivid and, precisely
because it is perverse, exemplary site for playing out or, more simply,
understanding the legal categories which constitute the subject.
To borrow a Roman law maxim, of which Legendre is fond, law's
function is "to institute life" [vitam instituere]9 and in so doing its
domain of application is co-extensive with the substantive domain
addressed by psychoanalysis. What psychoanalysis provides is a
method oflistening to and interpreting, both individual biography and
institutional history. It allows us access to what Legendre, mimicking
Freud, terms the "other dimension of law," namely its other scene or
unconscious. 10 In practical terms, psychoanalysis thus allows us to
address the most complex and critical of institutional questions, those
which relate to the subjectivity of legal practice and to what has

• DIGEST 1. 3. 2. The passage continues •Lex est omnium divinarum humanarumque
rerum regina" [law is the queen of all things divine and human]. See the discussion in
Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION 137 (Paris: Fayard, 1985).
10
See Legendre, "The Other Dimension of Law; in David Carlson and Peter Goodrich
(eds.), PsYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND THE PoSTMODERN

MIND (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1997).
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recently been termed the affectivity of law. 11 A psychoanalytic
jurisprudence could be said to address the subjective enigma-the
delirium-of institutions, and to ask the most simple and
unanswerable of questions. What is it that leads a subject to love the
social representation, the living image, or emblem of law? Equally,
what causes a subject to submit to the institution and to follow the
law? Why is it Lortie that is mad and not the government of
Quebec? 12

The answer to such questions can only be equivocal or contingent.
The institution which acts 'as if it were a person is not necessarily free
of those delirious, violent or poetic states which we term passion,
madness or love. What is principally at issue is the ability of the
subject to recognise its identity or place, its role within the familial
order of institutions or of household government. Whether institutional
or individual, madness is most immediately manifest in a failure to
recognise where, when and to whom a subject is entitled to speak. The
law in this context is simply the manifestation of power as a structure,
and madness is the failure to observe the space and the images or
faces of that manifest structure. Returning to the case of Corporal
Lortie and his psychotic endeavour to erase the social fantasm of
paternity, a government with the face of his father, the legal categories
that institute subjectivity, the function, and here the failure, oflaw are
peculiarly clear. Lortie's transgression emerged initially out of a desire
to destroy an evil father, the social image or fantasm of paternity, the
President of Quebec. This desire was expressed initially in terms of a
drive to prevent the destruction of the national language. While this
allusion to language might seem incidental, it can also be taken as the
most fundamental of references to structure and to law.
The third theme to be addressed relates to the particular form in
which the institution not only acts 'as if it were a subject but also acts
as if it had a body and so also, in Freudian terms, an unconscious.
Since Lacan, psychoanalysis has constantly emphasised the importance
of the fact that we are inhabitants oflanguage. To the observation that
language is the inescapable symbolic structure into which each subject
is born, Legendre adds that in the west we are the inhabitants of a
11
Linda Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering and Intimate Abuse,
86 Cornell L. Rev. 814 (1996).
12
This question is beautifully elaborated at length in Yifat Hachamovitch, •In
Emulation of the Clouds: An Essay on the Obscure Object of Judgement: in Costas
Douzinas, et. al. (eds.), POLITICS, P0STM0DERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (London:
Routledge, 1994).
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very specific material form or body of language, the text or written
reason oflaw. The reference to language, and so indirectly to texts and
to their Western manifestation as written law, thus refers us to the
foundational structure, the symbolic form and scriptural identity of
Western institutions. The question of law is a question of structure,
and for Legendre this means that it is a question of a Text-a Book or
books-which set out the specific social places of legitimate authority.
It is the text that establishes our social identity and institutional
place, it is the text which provides us with our jurisdiction or right of
speech, it is the text in which we are born and in which we die, or in
classical legal terms, Rome-a Text, a system of law-is our common
homeland (Roma communis nostra patria est). 13
The structural Text, or in one etymology, the terror and the
territory of the Western institution, has been that of Roman law and
specifically of the Corpus Juris Civilis which was received into the
Western tradition in the late twelfth century. It was through the
reception of this vast corpus of texts, according to Legendre and to
others, that the Western institution took on the historical and
essentially juristic form that we inherit to this day. 14 The reception
of Roman law was a complicated inheritance from the two Romes, that
of the Papacy and of canon law, and that of Justinian and the
transmission of a predominantly imperial law. 15 The systematisation
of these two textual systems through the categories of classical Roman
legal science constituted what Legendre refers to as the
twelfth-century interpretative revolution. The reception of Roman law
provided a textual method of social organisation and of institutional
action. It also set out the basic substantive categories of social

11

Digest 50.1.33, discussed in Legendre, LE D~SIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU. ETUDE SUR LES
MONTAGES DE L'ETAT ET DU DROIT 371-376 (Paris: Fayard, 1988). See also, Tim Murphy,
Memorising Politics of Ancient History, 50 Mod. L. Rev. 677 (1987).
u Legendre's views on what he terms the twelfth-century revolution of the
interpreters, can be found in LES ENFANTS DU TEXTE: ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE
DES ETATS (Paris: Fayard, 1992). For other attempts to address this theme, see Alan
Watson, THE CML LAW TRADITION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Harold
Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Donald Kelley, Gaius Noster:
Substructures ofWestern Legal Thought, 84 Am. Hist. Rev. 619 (1979); and more recently
Donald Kelley, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SocIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
15
A maxim from Gratian transmits the essential point: Duo sunt genera
christianorum--there are two genres of Christianity, that of the West and that of the
East, that of the Papacy and canon law, and that of Justinian and Roman law. See
generally Legendre, D~SIR POLITIQUE, supra note 13, at 289-318.
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structure and of subjective life. Most notable amongst these was the
principle of authority that attaches to the power of the father as the
author of law.
A fourth thematic homology between law and psychoanalysis lies
precisely in the complex notion of the 'paternity of law.' Corporal
Lortie's numerous references to father figures who variously command,
refuse, absolve, and haunt, invokes not only a modem Freudian image
of authority but also a classical legal reference. Roman law had
attributed an absolute power-a power over life and death-to the
head of the family, the paterfamilias. The private law right of the
father of the household mirrored the comparable public law power of
the emperor, the living voice of the law, whose very whim was
legislation, and whose 'pleasure'16 had the force of law. The power of
the emperor in its tum mirrored that of the divine father, of whose will
the sovereign was no more than the mouthpiece or tongue. To legislate
or speak the law was to take up a position in relation to a complex,
textually-defined order of precedence and of the names of the law. In
substantive terms, it was to find a place and role, an identity and
image, within the inscribed or textual order of power. To state the law
was literally to speak 'in the name of the father,' whether that father
was God, the emperor, the sovereign, the People, or the head of the
family. To take up the textually, and so also legally, defined position
of the father is to adopt an image or role, to speak "as the law." It is
this prior definition of the law of the Father, this abstract textual
demarcation of the sites of legitimate social speech, that Lortie
inadvertently recognised in explaining his parricidal intentions in
terms of a desire (and corresponding power) to destroy "this authority,"
namely a place, origin or source rather than a mere person or vicarious
legal office holder.
It was, in short, an image which Lortie desired to destroy, it was
the fantasm of paternity that constituted his "inner negativity" and
which his crime was gauged to expunge. The image has a crucial role
in Legendre's theory of law as in psychoanalytic interpretation more
generally. The image, or in Roman legal terms the imago, was the
social form of representation of the principle of authority, of Father,
sovereign or Law. At the level of the institution, the image of
authority, the effigy of social power or representation of collective
belonging is an object not only of fear but also of fascination and of
love. The image presents the absolute to the subject of law and so

11
The classical maxim was quod principi placuit legis habet potestatem (what pleases
the prince has the force of law).
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constitutes law as that discourse which can interpret, which is to say
mediate or speak between the divine and so unknowable space of
authority and the mundane instance of secular law. The image,
whether of the social father or of the familial authority, fixes the Law
within the individual subject as an ideal object of veneration or oflove.
The image is in this sense the mechanism of subjective submission to
social authority. At the level of the individual, the image also plays a
crucial role in the construction of the identity of the subject as a
subject of law. The image is here the means by which the subject is
differentiated from itself and so acquires an identity. It is through the
image, through seeing herself in the mirror, that the subject first
comes to recognise a unity and separation that allows her entry into
the social. 17
In the case of Lortie, the image had a crucial role to play at the
level both of the social and of the individual. At the level of the social,
it was precisely the image or the social face of authority which Lortie
attempted to erase from the text of the living. The image or face of the
father appears throughout Lortie's narrative and its interpretations.
More specifically, Lortie desired to take up the place of the father but
misrecognised that place as being that of his own father rather than
as the abstract instance of the principle of authority. Lortie desired to
take on the role of the father but feared becoming his own father. In
short he confused two distinct places or functions of the image. In
social terms, the image represents or more technically figures the
desirability of the textual order and its hierarchy of authoritative
places, its authors and authorities (auctor et auctoritas). The image
passes on the unsayable dimension of that power, and as an image it
can move between realms, as also between public and private,
institutionality and intimacy. It is thus not altogether surprising that
when Lortie viewed his own image, his own representation and acts,
on a video, he was able, at least to some degree, to identify with
himself and proclaim that "I cannot say that it is not me. It is me." His
virtual presence in the images relayed by the video was more real for
him as a mechanism of identification than the hyperreal experience of
killing that he had just undergone. In more technical terms, Lortie
could no longer deny or 'split off from' the inner negativity that was for

17

This thesis is elaborated most famously in Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as
Formative of the I," in ECRITS: A SELECTION (London: Tavistock, 1977). The elaboration
of the mirror stage with respect to the formation of institutional identity, is discussed
in Legendre, DIEU AU MIRROm. ETUDE SUR L'INSTITtmON DES IMAGES (Paris: Fayard,
1994).
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him represented by the figure of the bad father whom he did not wish
to become.
A fifth and final observation can again return us to the case of
Lortie and its peculiarly exemplary place in Legendre's account of the
relationship of psychoanalysis to law. Whatever the structural relation
or homology between psychoanalysis and law, and whatever
significance is to be given to what Legendre coins as "the insistence of
the law in the unconscious," the case of Lortie allows us to advert to
another point of confluence. Both psychoanalysis and law address cases
and so, in terms of method, both are forms of casuistry. In a sense, the
most profound though not necessarily the most acceptable connection
between the two disciplines is precisely the most obvious, namely their
common history of casuistry and their analogous attempts to provide
a normative resolution to individual cases of conflict or dispute. The
casuistic tradition, in other words, dates back to the medieval reception
of Roman and canon law and it entailed the reception and elaboration
of a complex apparatus of questions of conscience or problems of ethics
alongside the comparably normative questions of law. What is
significant is that these various disputed questions (quaestiones
disputatae) spanned the disciplines of moral theology and law and
addressed cases of conscience and of law, questions of ethics and of
legal judgement, in precisely similar terms. They alike belonged to the
"institution oflife," to the social expression of difference, to the realm
of things known and judged. In cruder terms, what is obvious is that
the individual case or 'cause of action' faces the law, whether it is that
of conscience or of the state, whether spiritual or secular, with the
individual, with a subject of decision that is necessarily intimate and
implicatory. 18 The case requires a judgment that will address the
subject, that will come face to face with the other, and so also with the
unconscious, while equally bringing the unconscious face to face with
its own law. It is in the historically complex theatre of the case and of
the art of casuistry that Legendre finds a space within which to
address the insistence of the law in the unconscious.

11

Thus Caudill, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW, supra note 6 (•If this study is
anything-scholarly, scientific--at all, it is personal, implicatory. In trying to maintain a
cautious distance from a theory -- Lacan's -- postulating that such distance is an illusion,
one fears to be only striking a pose.•). See also Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of
Righta-Consciowness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984).
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Questions of Method: The Double Reading
The case of Lortie, the case of a son who desires to kill his father
and who acts out that desire by endeavouring to kill the social face or
effigy of his father, the government of Quebec, raises a peculiarly
Freudian problem for legal analysis. 19 In Freudian terms, the Oedipal
desire of the son to kill the father lies at the basis of all law, and it is
this unconscious principle of authority which is lengthily elaborated in
Totem and Taboo. 20 Freud's myth of the law's origin takes as its
starting point the murder of the primordial father, who has
monopolised the females of the tribe, by his sons. Overcome with guilt
and remorse the sons then legislate against murder and thus
inaugurate ethics and law. Both domains are governed by the memory
of the absent father, by an image or totem that represents and reminds
the sons of their parricidal past. Law, in the form of a totemic figure,
a sovereign or social image of power, takes the place of the murdered
mythical father and becomes the object of social desire.
One way of interpreting Freud's mythical presentation of the
totemic character of law is simply to say that the authority of law is
inextricably bound to its mythical origins and to the symbolic forms
which represent that myth in the contemporary public sphere. At the
level of the social, law is necessarily predicated upon an absent source
of authority which, in its most direct form, is variously represented as
God, nature, reason, sovereign, or King. The symbolic order, in other
words, rests upon an unsayable or immutable yet invisible source of
law which can only be represented or symbolised in the various figures
of the power of law. 21 The symbolism of law, in classical terms the
social figure of a leader or communal father, masks or screens a truth
which cannot be directly stated or shown: "since an emperor cannot be
present to all persons, it is necessary to set up the statue of the

19
For an analysis of another case in which a son kills his father ("It is impossible to
blow open the top of a man's head, says the judge in Moloney, a case about a man who
blows open the top of a man's head, to unshell it, as it were, so as to examine his
thinking like an oyster, or a watch-spring, or a nut•), see Yifat Hachamovitch, 'The
Dummy: An Essay on Malice Prepensed• in Peter Rush, Shaun McVeigh, Alison Young
(eds.), CRIMINAL LEGAL DocTRINE (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). The case reference is
to R v Moloney (1985] AC 905.
IIO Sigmund Freud, TOTEM AND TABOO: RESSEMBLENCES BETWEEN THE PsYcmc LIFE
OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939).
21
Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE, at 266, citing Justinian, NOVELS 98, 2, 2 (post Deum

communis omnibus pater).

1996

"The Unconscious Is a Jurist"

207

Emperor in law courts, marketplaces, public assemblies and
theaters-in every place, in fact, in which an official acts, the imperial
effigy must be present, so that the Emperor may thus confirm what
takes place, for the Emperor is only a human being and he cannot be
everywhere."22 The space of the social is marked in advance by law.
The unconscious of the institution here takes the form of a plastic and
textual imaginary, while the power oflaw becomes that of an endless
array of dignities, roles, and textual figures which bear the delegated
authority of an absent source. Curiously institutional desire is
prompted by a lack, the legal subject is not and cannot be the one who
the dignity or role represents. The institution is only ever an image of
its absent reason or cause. Similarly, at the level of the legal subject
or individual, Freudian analysis, and, one might add, the history of
law, suggest a comparably hidden basis or unconscious source of action
in the drives or desires of the libidinal subject. 23
In the first instance, the problem raised by psychoanalysis, in
relation both to the institution and to the individual, is that although
it is .,evident that law addresses a vast array of issues that diversely
imply myth and the unconscious structure of social life, law has lost
the tools for addressing such issues. The effacement of legal history
and of the plural historical forms of legal knowledge, however, is only
one aspect of the problem. At the level of the disciplines, the repression
of the history of law as a social and philosophical form of life is
symptomatic of a more pervasive legal 'will to ignorance,' which is
expressed most directly in the lawyer's denial of the relevance of
affectivity to judgment or desire to law. In disciplinary terms, that
denial is replicated in an even stronger form in the jurisprudential
repression of psychoanalysis and the willingness of the legal academy
to act as if the discoveries of Freud and the writings of Lacan had
either never happened or, if sufficiently rigorously ignored, would go
away. Despite the essentially symbolic and heavily interpretative
nature of legal regulation it is somehow easier or less threatening to
the "graveyards"24 that pass themselves off as legal academies to
ignore the other scene or unconscious of law. 25 The supposed science

22
Kenneth Setton, CHRISTIAN ATI'ITUDES TOWARDS THE EMPEROR IN THE FOURTH
CENTURY 196 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941).
21
See particularly Sigmund Freud, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (London:
Hogarth, 1961).
14
Legendre, L'AMOUR DU CENSEU: ESSAI SURE L'ORDRE DOGMATIQUE 14 (Paris: Seuil,
1974).
lll5 See Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES tcHAPPtES DU TEXTE: LECONS SUR LA
COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIELLE 12 (Paris: Seuil, 1982) referring to •the indolent
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of law is deemed capable of dealing with the logic of legal rule as a
pure surface amenable to an exclusively rational interpretation. It is
this refusal to think about the irrational or simply subjective
dimensions of law, this refusal to consider the symbolic significance of
law, that leads Legendre to castigate roundly an "imbecility at the
basis of law," and a comparable practical stupidity, in terms of which
"lawyers do not even aspire to think," but simply circulate texts and
other emblems of social power. 26
In the context of such a lack of thought, and more broadly in view
of the repressive functions of law, psychoanalysis is both obviously
relevant and obviously threatening to the discipline or 'science' of legal
studies. The first project of Legendre's work has thus been simply to
insist upon the relevance of psychoanalysis to legal studies, and indeed
to any intelligent consideration of the general significance of the legal
institution and practice of law. In this respect it is apposite to invoke
the earlier and parallel history of the denial of psycho-analysis by
Freud's contemporaries and institutional critics. Psycho-analysis
threatened to rupture the dogmatic order of knowledges and it
continues to threaten the complacency-the 'ignorance,' 'indolence' and
'lack of culture'---of the disciplines. At the level of the disciplines,
Legendre argues, the heretic or simply disruptive theoretical task of
psychoanalysis is to listen to the repressed histories and abandoned or
forgotten knowledges of the scholastic tradition as it has been
inherited in the west through medieval law: "Where, in our day, can
we find the heirs of the medieval jurists?"27 Who today, in other
words, reworks the dogmatic discourse on the governance of the soul,
on the fantasm, on faith, fascination, authority or censure? Where does
contemporary jurisprudence account for the most prominent function
of law, that of engendering subjective belief in authority? Psychoanalysis in other words disturbs the masks, the distances, and the
political compromises of the modern academic disciplines. It does so
through its pervasive reference to the spectre of sexuality, to the figure
of the desiring subject and so also of the role of Eros, Christian caritas,
or love in any living form of truth and equally in any plausible account
of law within what is still an essentially Christian culture. 28

pedagogues ... who doubtless hope that the discoveries of Freud and Lacan will disappear
from circulation.• For further discussion of the 'dark' continent of psychoanalysis, see
Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 8-9, 17-23.
28
Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE LA vtarrt 26 (Paris: Fayard, 1983).
27
Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 17.
38
See Sigmund Freud, "Resistances to Psychoanalysis," arguing that "Psychoanalysis
reveals the weaknesses of the [social] system and recommends that they be abandoned ....
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At the level of institutions and so of the social history of law,
Legendre's insistent recourse to psychoanalysis offers what he terms
a "counter-dogmatics" or radical re-reading of the legal tradition. 29 At
the level of the institution, as also at that of the individual, law masks
conflict and represses dispute. The theatre of legal reason exists to
cover over the violence and the madness of power. Its function is to
make believe that law is reason and to hide the fact that law is also
power, and in more technical terms, that the authorship of law is
cognate with its authority. In short, the classical "theatre of Justice
and of Truth" (Theatrum veritatis et iustitiae)30 conceals another
history, a latent history or positive unconscious of the legal tradition
which contains law's failures, its lapses, its shattered dreams, as also
it harbours its desires, its enjoyments, its reverie of a comprehensive
system and perfect order of rational rule. In other words, there is no
single or merely internal history of law; there are rather plural
histories of various laws, of different jurisdictions and changing
institutional forms. It is, therefore, the function of a psychoanalytic
account of law to provide symptomatic readings of the history of the
legal institution and to attend to the desires that underpin law, to
listen to the narrative of the lawyer's love of power and to the latent
poetry of the legal text. Legendre's work starts out, in other words,
from the fact that the history of the Western legal tradition is a history
of dogmatic reason and of the institutional forms of life which dogma
inscribed as law. What is at issue in law's institution of life is not only
a question of legal logic, it is also a matter of faith, of love, and of the
poetry of the soul. In the latter, less rationalistic terms, it is
Legendre's argument that the legal institution deserves to be taken
seriously, to be interpreted in the same way as other dreams. In short,
it deserves what Freud termed a 'double reading,' one attentive to both
its manifest and its latent meanings. 31
The other dimension of the Western legal tradition to which
psychoanalysis directs our attention is that of what Legendre terms

For having formulated these critiques, psychoanalysis, the enemy of civilisation, has been
banned as a public danger,W cited and discussed in Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 22.
29
Legendre, AMOUR DU CENSEUR, at 16-17.
ao See Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION. ETUDE UR LE PRINCIPE
otNtALooIQUE EN OCCIDENT 42 (Paris: Fayard, 1985), citing the treatise of the same title
by Jean-Baptiste de Luca (1614-1683). See also DIGEST 50.17.207: 'res judicata pro
veritate accipitur' (the judgment of a case is received into the place of truth).
11
For an instructive account of Freud's concept of double reading, see Sarah Kofman,
THE CHILDHOOD OF ART: AN INTERPRETATION OF FREUD'S AESTHETICS ch. 1 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988).
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the "non-legal scene of law."32 It is the history of the symbolic
materials that were used to fabricate a discourse of life and of death,
and to institute an art of law which could address the subjective needs
and desires of the institutional subject. The specific problem to be
addressed initially is that of the way in which law creates not simply
a system of rules but an aesthetic, a culture or form oflife. It is in this
regard that psychoanalysis attempts to listen not to the apparent logic
of legal rule, but rather to the figures of its texts and the erotics of its
practices, of its theatre and its rites. The classical notion of an art of
law is thus to be recuperated and interpreted quite literally, so that
the legal scholar can begin to address directly the significance of the
symbols, emblems, rituals, icons and diverse other signs through which
a legal tradition establishes a culture and embeds itself in its subjects.
The aesthetics of law and the love of power
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the most striking feature of
law is its desire to establish and promulgate order. In classical legal
terms, this desire for order was expressed in a variety of ways but can
be addressed most directly through recognising the fundamentally
aesthetic character of institutional attachment: "The power of
institutions is a product of their use of images ...to train the subject
aesthetically. It was for this reason that the classical tradition marked
out a pre-theoretical space and time of rhetoric, a time which is well
reflected in a maxim such as: 'Nothing is more beautiful than order'
(Nihil pulchrius ordine)."33 The first lesson of the aesthetics of law is
that to capture the subject for the institution involves a delicate and
complicated play of attraction and of threat and needs to be understood
in the psychoanalytical terms of desire. Aesthetics teaches us that the
institution of the subject requires the inscription of an image of the
social as an object of love. More paradoxically perhaps, the subject
must come to desire its submission to power, the subject must love the
signs of power, the emblems of an authority which cannot be physically
present everywhere and so must appear most usually in fantasmatic
or imagistic forms.
The aesthetics of law addresses the cultural desire of legal
institutions as well as the mechanisms by means of which they attach

32

Legendre, LoRTIE, at 69.
Legendre, LES ENFANTS DU TEXTE. ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE DES ETATS
55 (Paris: Fayard, 1992). To teach respect for order and through that respect, belief in
and love for authority, was a very common glossatorial theme.
3S
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themselves to their subjects. In this respect, the aesthetics of law
returns legal analysis to some of the most radical and least studied
dimensions of the legal tradition. The history of the mediaeval legal
tradition was a history of a dual law, of utrumque ius, u meaning that
human law was only ever a pale reflection of a divine law and of a
spiritual governance of secular powers. The beauty of order was a
divine beauty and its rule addressed both earth and heaven, polity and
spirituality. The legal construction oflife was thus in the first instance
a spiritual endeavour because culture was a matter of ghostly or
unseen powers and in its canonical definition "consisted in the
observation of omens and the interrogation of the course of the
stars. "36 What is significant in such a broad (and in this instance
negative) definition of culture is a recognition of the plurality of
cultural spaces and so of the forms of knowledge and of the diversity
of objects of law's regulation. Even within the common law tradition,
the role of the sovereign was early on defined explicitly as that of a
'nursing father' and in consequence tutelage of the soul and governance
of life-style or 'care of the self was recognised as being as much an
issue of law as the more obvious and less interesting regulations of
municipal intercourse. 36 The institution is established so as to create
subjects. It is also to be understood literally as a nursery that becomes
a parent to children: "a mother that nourishes not those who want but
those who follow her rule; such an allegiance already supposes an
apprenticeship, the entry into the imaginary space of the institution
whose subjects are infants.... The centralized organisation works
towards the production of infants. "37
The institution has as its goal the mad project of creating human
subjects. It is through law, and specifically through the law, through
the Roman categories of persons, things and actions, that the social
subject acquires an identity and the power to act. Each subject is born
twice, once to nature and once to law. And yet that creation of persons

u See Legendre, •Le droit romain, mod~le et langage: De la signification de
l'Utrumque Ius: reprinted in Legendre, ECRITS JURIDIQUES DU MOYEN AGE OCCIDENTAL
(London: Variorum, 1985).
111
Gratian, DECRETALS, Cause 26, Question 2, Canon 9; di8CU8sed in Legendre, AMOUR
DU CENSEUR, at 263.
se On the role of the sovereign as 'nursing father,' see Roger Coke, ELEMENTS OF
POWER AND SUBJECTION OR THE CAUSES OF ALL HUMANE, CHRISTIAN AND LEGAL SOCIETY
98 (London: T. Newcomb, 1660). See generally, Peter Goodrich, OEDIPUS LEX:
PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW 223-245 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
17
Legendre, JOUIR DU POUV0IR. TRArn: SUR LA BUREAUCRATIE PATRIOTE 190 (Paris:
Editions de Minuit, 1976).
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which is subsumed under the ius personarum or, as Legendre adapts
it, the law of masks, 38 is not simply a matter of legal rules, it is also
a more profound and complicated governance of drives and desires. The
institution has to reproduce itself at the most fundamental of levels,
it has to attach itself to the unconscious, it has enter into the space of
desire and reproduce "an excess or beyond of that which is said ...."39
The role of law in the institutional production or 'fabrication' of
subjects has to be understood historically not simply in terms of a
secular law of succession but also in terms of the transmission of a
much more ineffable principle of authority or belief in power: "The
great ravings of power, those which make the body walk with the soul,
that is to say those which mobilise the unconscious towards death, can
only be stated poetically, because power is organised fictively, and
most particularly according to the fiction of the all-powerful. Power is
absolutely mad because, following the Christian discourse of the
all-powerful, power makes everything out of nothing.""°
The madness of power, the delirium of institutions, the paternity
of law over its infantilised subjects, is a function not of reason but of
an art of law (ars iuris) which captures subjectivity. The institution
and more specifically the law enters the subject not through rules but
through language and through images. The image of power-of the
law-giver or sovereign, of God, emperor, legislature or even something
as unconscious as the 'rule of recognition' or 'basic norm'-is a point of
transition between the public sphere and the private space of
subjectivity. The structure of that entry of law into the subject is a
structure of love, or in Augustine's terms it is structura caritatis. The
social image of power has to become an object of desire whereby, in one
of Legendre's most famous phrases, the subject can come to 'love the
censor' or to enjoy power. The law must have an author and that
author must be an object of love, a father, a name, an image that
represents both the sanctity and the madness-the violence-of power.
38

Legendre, DESIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 225-26: •Note that one of the central
constructions of civil law, that which, following Justinian's terminology, we call the law
of persons, literally derives from persona-- referring initially to an actor's mask--and
allows me to translate the formula de iure personarum by 'of the law of persons.' In all
institutional systems the political subject is reproduced through masks. This translation
also contributes to the rehabilitation of the problematic of the image at the heart of the
legal order.'' For commentary on this point, see •Law's Emotional Body: Image and
Aesthetic in the Work of Pierre Legendre," in Peter Goodrich, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM
LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MAsKS (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990).
39
Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION: ETUDE SUR LE PRINCIPE
GENEALOGIQUE EN OCCIDENT 140 (Paris: Fayard, 1985).
40
Legendre, PAROLES POETIQUES, at 212.
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The social father or law-giver is one who speaks 'in the name of' the
principle of authority, who judges in the name of the law, who effaces
himself so as to allow the text to speak, or in more classical terms
"judgement is received in the space of truth. "'1 What is crucial is that
it is by virtue of position, by virtue of speaking from the emblematic
place of truth, that law transmits its message or passes on its form.
The structure of political desire replicates that of faith in God and
demands a comparable and unthinking love. Political love is directed
towards the images of a power that is never present in a body but only
ever represented emblematically and vicariously by the delegates ofits
absolute yet invisible source. The sovereign may embody the law, and
classically both the sovereign and the judiciary were thought to
somehow incorporate the law either by carrying its spirit in their
breast or by giving it birth in their speech, but they nevertheless were
only ever representatives of a source of law in whose name they spoke.
The authority of law was an abstract one which could only ever be
mediated by its secular representatives, so much so that the medievals
adopted the maxim that only where the body was absent could authority be present (absens corpore, praesens auctoritate). The consequence
of the absence of any physical or indeed temporal source of law, and it
is legitimate to observe that even in contemporary terms, the State,
the Government or the sovereign legislature have no extant or natural
form, the object of desire was always an impossible one. The subject,
in other words, can love the emblems of power, the icons of law, the
images or effigies of social authority but that love is necessarily
directed through the image to an invisible source: "If jurists deny that
they create the Law by means of which the administration maintains
its legitimacy, and declare themselves to be no more than its
transmitters, if they are simply the bearers of the most authentic of all
possible meanings, the author of this dictation ...is someone
invisible. "'2

The Poetic Rights of the Text
The double reading which psychoanalysis suggests as the
appropriate method for understanding the subjective force of
institutional attachments is nonetheless a reading. Although, following
the maxim ut pictura scriptura (painting as prose), the Western
tradition is well aware of the various non-scriptural expressions of

41
42

DIGEST 50. 17. 207 (Res judicata pro veritate accipitur)
Legendre, JOUIR DU POWOIR, at 62.
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inscription or writing, it is still the case that the principal historical
form of power has been the body or books of written law. The abstract
principle of power which the institution represents is not a subject and
it cannot be referred to any specific unconscious or any individual
body. The unconscious of the institution necessarily refers to a
structure, and more precisely to language. The specific institutional
form of that language is writing: "In other words, if institutions are
both speechless and delirious, silent and raving, reasoning and
persecuting, this cannot be in the same sense as the discourses of
schizophrenia or paranoia, such as they are treated by the psychiatry
of mental states. The madness of institutions is real, but it is not an
ordinary madness: it is a sacred madness.... The system of Law
necessarily passes through this point of delirium: the Reason of the
Text declares itself in the same instance as the delirious questions and
mythic fabrications of national institutions are formulated. 1143
The structural form of the Western institution is that of written
reason or written law. The two great textual systems of the west are
those of divine and human law and they are expressed in complex
codified written forms. The institution may not have a physical
presence, but it has a body, a corpus of writing and of law. In a
formulation which Legendre borrows from Isidore of Seville, the word
law is cognate with reading because law is written: lex a legendo
vocata est, quia scripta est (law comes from the word to read, because
it is written)." At the foundation of the Western legal tradition lie
various monumental writings, codes of divine and human law, which
found the Western institution and establish the structural and
fundamentally symbolic forms of social life. The insistence of the law
in the unconscious of the Western institution is the insistence of a
hierarchical tradition of great texts or, to borrow Legendre's phrase,
the insistence of a Text without a subject. The textual system in
question dates back to the earliest sacral codifications of Roman law,
but has its major expression in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis and the
dogmatic tradition that developed around the reception of that vast
compilation of law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 45

43
Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 53.
" Legendre, DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 297, citing Isidore of Seville, ETYMOLOGIAE.
415
For a technical account of the reception, see Legendre, LA PtNETRATION DU DROIT
ROMAIN DANS LE DROIT CANONIQUE CLASSIQUE (Paris: Imprimerie Jouve, 1994). For an
introductory analysis of the significance of the textual and interpretative techniques
developed by the Romano-canonic glossatorial tradition, see Peter Goodrich, READING
THE LAW (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
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To understand the textual tradition oflaw, the classical heritage
of ratio scripta or written reason, and the aesthetic and casuistic rules
that developed around its interpretation, as the unconscious of the
Western institution, again requires a double reading. The principal
methodological contribution of psychoanalysis to law, lies in the
demand that the textual tradition, the books and other writings oflaw,
be treated as symptoms of a fundamentally political desire. The
Textual system of law inscribes the specific form of the Western polity
or institution of life and has in consequence to be understood, to be
read and interpreted, according to the hierarchy of meanings which the
system establishes. The Text establishes in a ritual form the order of
texts which will constitute both the power and the meanings of social
life. For this monumental task to be possible, it is necessary to
understand the textual system symptomatically and to interpret the
'work of the text' in a psychoanalytically informed manner.
The Text of law is first a sign of sociality, a vast emblem of the
possibility of collective being, a mirror which reflects the transcendental properties of a culture, namely that culture--dignitas or
ius-does not die. The initial or founding moment of the textual
tradition is necessarily obscure, let us say unconscious, because the
Text must detach itself from the discourse of municipal institutions
and transcribe itself within the delirium or space of truth. Such is to
say that the first task of the textual tradition is to screen the absence
of any tangible source of authority or law. The Text must have access
to the space of truth, the space occupied by God or nation or some
other icon of social belief. However much a secularised tradition may
wish to read the textual tradition more geometrico, in terms of the
beauty of order and the logic of rules, it must first presuppose the
phenomenon of the Text and a faith which binds us to law.46 In the
first instance the Text does not explain so much as it implies a series
of foundational symbols of social life: the Text establishes the subject's
relation to death just as much as it places her in relation to the
institution of life.
The twelfth-century reception of Roman law inherited a notion of
the Text of law as being the most divine of knowledges: to be learned
in the law is the most sacred of things (res sacratissima civilis
sapientia).' 7 Two connotations of that sanctity of the Text and of the

" On the faith which attaches to instruments (that is to say to texts), see Legendre,
DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 289-297; and also Legendre, "Expertise d'un texte," in LA
PYSCHANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE JUIVE? 93-113 (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
7
'
DIGEST 50.13.155. For discussion, see Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE LA vtRITt, at 51-55.
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hierarchical order of textuality deserve specific elaboration. The
written character of law and the relation of that writing to a hidden
divine source served to detach legal textuality from the mundane
legibility of secular speech. That the law was written, implied a
fatality or destiny to the social which could neither be changed nor
disobeyed. That the law was written implied that human life was
already inscribed and accounted within the Text and such a fatality
could only be understood and lived-it could not be rewritten but only
trusted and believed. The discourse of law was thus referable to the
space of truth. What was fundamental to society, namely the truth,
was written. It was a discourse of foundations, an inaugural speech, an
expression of the order of things, of the various signs and other
enigmas of the divine and of its control over life and death. The
aesthetic of law and the dependence of law upon a fictitious space of
origin or truth is a necessary feature of establishing the extemality of
the authority in whose name the legislator or judge can speak the law.
The guarantee of law is a fiction of truth, an image which establishes
the unspeakable power of judgement and inscribes it in the
fantasmatic space of its subjects.
The legal concept of Text and of textual system was initially
mystical and required comparably initiate forms of reading and
interpretation. In a surprisingly literal sense, the Text was the body
of the social, it was in one etymology the terror and territory of the
social, the space and conceptual geography that a culture inhabited.
What was necessary to law was first a belief in the Text, a faith in
instruments, and not a mere understanding or secular use. The textual
system represented the signs or augurs of things divine, the arcana
iuris which addressed matters of life and death, and in consequence
was to be approached mystagogically, through signs, through images
and an emblematic speech. In its deepest substrate, the Text was a
figure of truth, it was an opaque sign, a dark letter, an incomprehensible writing. Such a view of the textual unconscious may seem
bizarre but it needs to be remembered that such a notion of the
symbolic power oflaw, as well as of its opacity or indeterminacy, is not
lacking modem representations. What psychoanalysis suggests is that
modem law needs to recollect the incomprehensibility or irrationality
of the Text and of the law: "It is impossible to approach Roman law
without reinstating what I call the rights of incomprehension and the
sense of enigma" by means of which it is transmitted. 48

"Legendre, L'EMPIRE DE WRrra, at 132.
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The enigma or symbolic character of the Text relates to the
foundational quality of law as the means by which a culture institutes
life. For law to take hold of the subject, for the subject to become
attached to law, it is necessary that the textual culture of the
institution be capable of becoming an object of fear and oflove, just as
its Text would literally be guarded and venerated, both as manuscript
and as meaning, by the mystagogues of the legal tradition.'9 A system
of law, in other words, is not simply a logic of rules or empire of
reason, it is also a figure of attachment, a fiction or theatre of
subjective meanings and affectivities. The desire of the lawyer to order
the texts of law more geometrico, or in the manner of a geometry,
already displays an aesthetic or artistic inclination. 50 It takes only a
small further step to understand that beneath that mask of order or
screen of precision lie many other dimensions of attachment to Image,
Text and Law. It is necessary to bind the unconscious of the subect to
the order of texts or to the culture that the Text represents. Such is
the exercise or jurisdiction of power over the imagination and to
understand that power, to understand law, it is necessary, therefore,
to acknowledge its symbolic function and its poetic qualities, its latent
meanings, its texts.
To establish the necessary bond between subject and law, the
legal order depends not simply upon fear of law's violence but much
more generally upon a structure of political love. The primary form of
that bond or vinculum is constructed through the textuality of law. In
several early works, Legendre is at pains to indicate that this exercise
of power over the social subject is never simply a matter of a surface
structure of communication. It is a matter of the aesthetics and poetics
by means of which law establishes an unthinking adherence, a
fantasmatic authority, an unconscious bonding, the goverance of the
soul. It is this delirious or mythical dimension to the circulation and
dissemination of legal texts that positivistic theories of law have lost
and so too have denied themselves the possibility of comprehending the
social reality of law. That reality is a symbolic one and includes not
simply submission to known rules and apparent and comprehended
authorities but also a much more mystical apprehension of social
49

See Francois Hotman, ANTI-TRIBONIAN OU DISCOURS D'UN GRAND ET RENOMME
IURISCONSULTE SUR L'ESTUDE DES LOlX, 120 (Paris: Perrier, 1603Xdiscussing the text of

the Corpus iuris ciuiliaX"[G]uarded like a precious and sacred relic, only rarely being
shown, at night, surrounded by candles and torches ... thus did the ancient mystagogues
show their sacral law to the faithful.~)
50
Legendre, JoUIR DU POUVOIR, at 162. See also, Jacques Lenoble and Francois Ost,
DROIT, MYTHE ET RAISON (Bruxelles: Presse Universitaire de Saint Louis, 1981).
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structure and of Law as the Western form of fate spelled out in nature
or in the living bodies or speaking signs of political and legal
authority. 61 The right to incomprehension or to poetry which
Legendre elaborates, is in essence a right to interpretation in the
strongest of senses, a right to love and to a life of the soul which
understands that the meaning of written reason or of Text is both
secular and spiritual, of the surface and of the soul: "The reproduction
of institutions takes place through a discourse of fiction concerned with
the internal structure or space of the imaginary.... The discourse of
fiction is in this sense a logic of commentary and it extends so as to
deploy the various signs around which the fantasmatic body of the
subject is elaborated. "62
The structure of subjective identification with the institution
depends upon the manipulation of the subject around the imaginary
sites of the text. It requires a rethinking of the text in terms of a latent
poetics which takes hold of the subject and institutes its soul through
an unconscious desire or unspeakable symbolism of law. It requires
that we understand a certain madness or poetry of the text, a meaning
that lies beyond the prosaic or dead letter of the law, one which
inhabits a domain of living law, of the theatre of justice and the
judgment of truth. It is here that we can refer to what the mediaeval
jurists termed officium poetae, the poetic function, which was to say
what could not be said other than through poetry, through metaphor
and the figures of speech which has elsewhere been termed the lover
at work in discourse. 63 The text, in other words, is an initiate or
sacral form of knowledge. It is the discourse of the imaginary other, it
is a letter which falls from the sky, a poetic mask and so also an object
oflove. It is with that love or structura caritatis, that Legendre begins:
"What is exquisite in the discovery of a manuscript is precisely that
one does not understand. The letter arrives, addressed and received,
yet unreadable. The discovery of a manuscript is a poetic event, an
event of writing. An unknown writing plays on the imagation like a

51
With regard to the various classical formulae for the legislator: lex animata, lex
loquens, viva vox iuris, and indeed the notion that law, reading and delirium are closely
connected (loi, lire, delire); see Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 267 and 293.
52
Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 137; see also 53-55, 57-66.
u On the officium poetae, see also Placentinus, "Senno de legibus: the text of which
is reproduced in Herman Kantorowicz, The Poetical Sermon of a Medieaval Jurist.
Placentinus and his •sermo de Legibus, 2 J. Warburg and Courtauld Institute 22 (1938);
and Peter Goodrich, Translating Legendre: The Poetical Sermon of a Contemporary
Jurist, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 963 (1995). The reference to Barthes is to A LoVER'S
DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 158 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979).
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painting.. .it is an illegible letter addressed to the subject who would
desire it. "64
The psychoanalytic jurist's reference to the poetry of the text and
more strongly to the function of poetry in the institution of law finds
ample expression within the history of the Western legal tradition. The
text was always to be understood as containing a hidden meaning or
poetic core and it was this fantasm or beyond of the word that the
Christian legal tradition taught lawyers to address. It was to this
latent meaning of the text, this 'other world of interpretation,' that the
power of writing was addressed. There was both "that which was
written and something else that was there, something more. It was
this something more that Justinian evoked in Novel 146 under the
formula non solis litteris adhaerare, meaning literally to adhere not
only to the letters."55 The letter of the law was never self-sufficient
and the mediaeval tradition was at great pains to emphasise that
methods of legal commentary and interpretation depended upon a
complex of rhetorical and extrinsic techniques of construction and
evaluation of the text. For the glossatorial tradition the text was only
ever a more or less complex sign of what Bude termed "the spirit of
Latinity," an interlinear meaning, a spiritual or anagogic sense which
the words both harboured and veiled. It was thus possible for the
lawyers of the reception both to believe in the absolute reason of
written law and to adhere to the maxim that writing is not the
substance of law (scriptura non est substantia legis). 66 In a language
that in many respects comes close to that of psychoanalysis, the
interpreter of the law was subject to a series of protocols which
emphasised in detail the plurality and the power of textual meaning.
I will simply avert to the most standard of traditional protocols
of legal reading, namely that it is not the letter but the spirit that
determines the meaning of law. The text is composed of dead letters
(litera mortua),67 the rule is no more than a "mute judge," a sleeping
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Legendre, PAROLES POETIQUES, at 221.
Legendre, D~IR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 295.
1541
Legendre, Dtsm POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 316. With respect to the philological views
of Guillaume Bud~, see DE PHILOLOGIA 47, 143 (Paris: Vascosan, 1536), discussing
literarum studium and the spirit of Latinity.
a7 This Pauline distinction can be found in Francis Bacon, THE ELEMENTS OF THE
COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND (London: I. More, 1630) at A 2 a: •for if it be true that
silent leges inter arma, it is also as true, that your majesty is in a double respect the life
of our lawes: once, because without your authority they are but litera mortua, and
againe, because you are the life of our peace, without which lawes are put to silence...."
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form58 requiring the interposition or anima legis of jurist or judge.
What is significant is not that the law is an unconscious text, a
symptom, intensity or spirit, but rather that the meaning of law is
internal to its living body, viva vox iuris, lex loquens, its image,
interpreter or legislator. In classical terms, it is spelled out by
reference to something beyond words: "To know the law is not to know
the words of the law, but its force and power."59 In a Renaissance
formulation we are similarly told that "no words, forms, niceties, or
propriety of language is of any regard in the Civil Law, in comparison
to truth, faithfulness and integrity. For verba menti, non verbis servire
debet; words are made as instruments to serve and express the mind,
and not to command it. "60 Truth, in other words, might be captured
by writing but it could only be discovered by an interpretation that
went beyond the words and participated in the delirium of the text. In
Sir Edward Coke's formulation, "in reading it is not the words but the
truth which ought to be loved (in lectione non verba sed veritas est
amanda)."61 In short, the jurist requires the reader or subject of law
to love, and in doing so refers to a latent meaning or power, namely
the capacity of the text to elicit subjective adherence, a faith or caritas
that belongs not only to the secular letter of the law, but also refers to
the space of the divine. Beyond the letter or between the lines, the text
embodies a passion, truth or spirit that belongs to the time of structure
and to the inaugural space of reference and of Law. It was for this
reason that Renaissance lawyers understood that legal meaning could
only properly be found in the soul or heard beside or beneath or
beyond the text, subauditio or subintellectio as an intuition, image or
unconscious form. 62
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See particlularly Sir John Davies, •A Discourse of Law and Lawyers," in A.B.
Grosart (ed.), SIR JOHN DAVIES: COMPLETE WORKS 275-277 (London: private circulation,
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THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION ch. 10 (Cambridge: Harvard University
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Dogmatics and Domesticity
In its most radical reading, Legendre's analysis of the legal
structure of social life suggests that the function of the lawyer is most
frequently an unconscious one. In the long term, it has not been the
role of the lawyer to think or to write but rather to represent, to speak
'in the name' of the law, to be an instrument of the text or the voice of
an authority or paternity exterior to him. Thus the lawyer counts for
nothing in the epiphany of law: "The enclosure of law is a space of
silence, it harbours nothing more than a set of highly valuable
techniques and the protocols of their application. The State depends
upon its jurists, precisely because they silence themselves. "63 The
lawyer is by tradition a messenger through whom someone else will
speak, he is the tool by means of which a greater authority, be it God,
nature, reason or sovereign, will write the law. In this sense, the
oracular role of the jurist is not to speak but to be spoken through, and
so to provide access to the unconscious space or immobile time within
which authority and law, reason and power are one.'u In Legendre's
terms it is the principal symbolic function of law precisely to maintain
or keep open the blank space of the social unconscious against which
a culture can maintain its myths and preserve its relation to poetry,
art and justice, fate or Law. The lawyer deals unwittingly with Law
and yet the role of the lawyer is intrinsic to the maintenance of the
symbolic structures of social life. In Lacan's terms there has to be an
ignorance that puts truth to work. 611
The place of truth or discourse of fate to which Law refers is
understood by Legendre in a classical Freudian sense. Law functions
to 'capture' the subject, to generate a submission to authority, and to
instigate a love of political power, in the specific form of the Western
institution. In one sense this means that the lawyer unconsciously
elaborates a dogmatics, a discourse of axiomatic social categories
within which the subject finds her place in relation to the extant order
of power. This, in Legendre's terms, is the discourse of genealogy, of

Thomas More. For discussion of his apologetic and polemical works, see Goodrich,
LANGUAGES OF LAW, supra note 38, at 72-82.
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Legendre, PAROLES POfflQUES, at 149.
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For an eloquent elaboration of this point, see Alain Pottage, "The Paternity of Law;
in Costas Douzinas, et. al. (eds.), POLITICS, POSTMODERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
148-150 (London: Routledge, 1994).
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the transmission of power across the generations. It establishes the
subject's familial fate 68 and provides him or her with a pre-ordained
place and role, and in the last instance an identity, within the order
of social life: "The fundamental axis of Roman law is the idea of the
Father as the institutional formulation of the principle of Reason. It is
the idea of God itself, as that in which we believe. ne7 The system of
Roman law is a familial one and it is precisely the common link
provided by the juridical principle of the family that binds the subject
to the institution. In this sense, the social construction of the subject
is to be understood as an intrinsically legal enterprise, because the
categories of lineage or of family place are the fundamental categories
oflaw.
At the level of the social, the classical order of interpretation and
of law descended in a hierarchical fashion from the divine father and
author of all laws. The concealed origin of law was screened by the
juridical image or figure of an ancestral or first source, which was
repeated throughout the social order of reason, text and law. Each
subsequent authority imitated the inaugural sovereignty of the author
of law, so that, for instance, Justinian described his own sovereignty
as being that of one who was, "after God, the common father of
everyone" within the Empire. 68 The principle of authority took the
form of a legal designation of paternal power and its repetitive
imitation in the order of institutional offices, dignities or roles. The
genealogical principles of succession which governed this "inestimable
object of transmission" legitimated authority by reference to the
hierarchical order by means of which the power to found and interpret
laws descended from its original and Pontifical source. 69
The Freudian construction of the social in terms of a family
governed by a series of paternal sources of law is, for Legendre, the
founding metaphor of Western institutions: "My theory is that the
State is the story of a family, in the Freudian sense ... ofbrothers who
are in love with their parents and at war with each other."70 The
crucial link between the institution and the subject thus takes the
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Legendre, LoRTIE, at 27-33; see also, Pierre Legendre, "Analecta: in Alexandra
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(Paris: Fayard, 1990).
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Legendre, DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 265.
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POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 267.
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DtsIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU, at 111.
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form of the social construction of the family and is expressed most
specifically in the legal definition of the place and power of the father
within the domestic family: "Power within the family derives from a
very precise order of political legitimacy. The function of the father in
Roman law could not have developed if it were not bound to power
within the city.... Paternity, in the full Roman sense of the status of
the pater familiae [head of the household], is not separable from the
political characteristics expressed by the concept of citizen (civis)." 71
The power of the father is not self-founding, it is legally instituted and
belongs within an order of names that descend from an absolute
Father, be that God, the People, or the Republic or America. It is
within the family that blood and love, law and pleasure are most
directly mixed and contained. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis
has such a crucial role to play in the development of a concept of the
legal construction or 'fabrication' of the subject, and it is for this reason
that an analysis of law cannot escape addressing either the role of the
father in the institution or the role of the institution in the father.
Both systems of power, public and private, are bound to a common
lineage, kinship or filiation, whereby the subject, the legally instituted
persona, is constructed and bound to the absolute, to the principles of
a power that transcends mortality and that survives across the
generations. At its most basic, the subject is born into an order of
precedence, which the glossators termed a law of the living (vivendi
leges): "defined as the general order of life, organised for humanity in
terms of a familial communication with God ... one which, according to
Rufinus, takes place by reference to the vertiginous rules of a
genealogical ceremony, one which celebrates the order of a God who is
Father of the family, and who institutes the places of his celestial
family (celestis familie officinas)."72 The celestial Father is explicitly
the model or prototype (pater prototypus) of all lesser forms of
paternity and by the same token the mundane family replicates the
spiritual order or hierarchy of family places. The domestic family
structure, in other words, is the point of entry into the symbolic, and
the places and roles which the family designates imply a law which
71
Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OB.JET DE LA TRANSMISSION, at 172. See further, Alain
Pottage, A Unique and Different Subject of Law, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161, 1198
(1995Xdeveloping the concepts of admiration and personality): "The most basic role of
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attaches itself to the most intimate or private spaces of subjective life,
a law that embeds itself within the affective structure of the
individual, a law that belongs to what Freudian jargon terms the
unconscious.
What is crucial to Legendre's analysis of the subject is the
recognition that the individual is born into law and is an individual
only by virtue of law. Within the Christian tradition the image of God
comes from inside, and the maxim that "I am in the father and the
father is in me" refers directly to the unbroken chain of paternal
authorities whereby tradition captures the subject in the very moment
of its institution as a subject. In Roman law a corresponding principle
defined father and son as being the same person (pater et filius easdem
esse persona)13 and ordained the submission of the child to the person
into whom they were born. The father was to be obeyed in the same
sense as the law was to be venerated for being what the tradition
poetically termed the image of the substance of the father. 7' The
structures of familial life, the early demarcation of domestic roles and
subjective places belong to the internal history oflaw, a history of the
soul and of its marking by law. What law institutes, in other words, is
not simply an exterior limit or subjection but equally an interior
emotional structure which will bind the subject through fear and
through love, through fascination and through fealty, to the theatre of
justice and truth. However much jurists may seek to deny it, there is
an affective dimension to the institution without which the ritual of
judgment and of interpretation of laws would be of minimal
consequence if not simply impossible.
Postface

It is Legendre's argument that in the same sense that precedent
inscribes a prior law or judgment that allows subsequent cases to be
treated normatively by reference to the repetition of authoritative
rules, so the psyche is also marked by and finds its place or persona
within a previously ordered domain of familial authority. The internal
principle or inscription of authority also helps explain the coincidence
of power and love, of normativity and desire. The institutional
structure of submission is infantile, the subject loves the law like a
child loves its parents. The filial nature of political desire or love of law
73
Code 6, 26, 11; discussed in Legendre, L'INESTIMABLE OBJET DE LA TRANSMISSION,
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is a constant theme within the legal tradition, and like any falling in
love it implies an unconscious or a beyond of desire that exceeds the
individual and so places the subject in a relation with legality. In one
early common law formulation: "To fear God is the effect of the law ....
This fear is as a son's fear for his father ... this fear is promoted by the
law."76 As the case of Lortie earlier suggested, the filial fear of law is
most immediately a response to the power of the father and is only
later a respect or love for the exterior images, rituals or ceremonies, by
means of which the social principle of paternity is inscribed.76 The
exterior forms oflaw are explicitly fictions in which the institution acts
as if it were a subject, a father, and equally as if its subjects were its
children.
The first task of a psychoanalytic theory of law was spelled out
by Legendre in one of his first works in terms of"the need to reinscribe
the link between the structures that surface during the course of
psychoanalysis and the institutions which are materialised in legal
discourse .. .in both cases there is but one text, which solemnises
conflict, excludes alternative interpretations and methodically follows
the path of its subject." The two discourses develop in parallel and it
is the task of legal theory to move from one to the other and so to
elaborate the mechanisms that tie the subject to its social place: "We
do not yet know how to pass from one domain to the other, from the
drama of analysis in which the patient develops his or her own spoken
text to the juridical simulation in which, under the mask of writing,
the Law speaks ...."77
Legendre's proposal for relating or reconciling the two
foundational levels of legal socialisation is to suggest a systematic
correspondence between the two orders. In Legendre's analysis the
legal structure mimics the psychic structure for the simple historical
reason that the scholastic categories which were elaborated to govern
the soul (regimen animarum) were to a very considerable extent
coincident with the dogmatic categories of social regulation. The lesson
of genealogy is precisely that both subject and law descend from the
same system of names, the same dogmatic order of categories and
classifications, from the same familial structure of meaning: "The most
private, the most intimate, that which is at the heart of the concept of
a subject, to know the fantasm, is already marked by the seal of the
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genealogical order. All subjects carry within them, if I can express
myself in this way, the institutional order under the primary form of
familial institution. "78 In dogmatic terms, the child is a portion of the
mother's entrails79 and bears the image of the father, his similitudes
or likenesses-vestigiis et similitudinibus-on the soul.80
In some of his later work, Legendre has revived the classical
conception of the Fates to depict the largely ignored prescriptive and
providential dimensions of law. The Fates spoke the subject in
advance. They indicated that the individual entered an institution of
life and that the individual was destined to die. The subject thus
experiences the institution of the family as a prior order or fate, as a
first law which can neither be resisted nor evaded. The crime of
Corporal Lortie can in this respect be treated by Legendre as fated to
happen by virtue of a genealogical failure, namely that Lortie was born
into a family which had transgressed the order of familial places: not
only was his father a tyrant who recognised no limits to his violence
but he also engaged in incestuous relations with his children-Lortie's
youngest 'sister' was the child of his eldest sister. Wishing to kill the
government of Quebec-"the government which had the face of my
father"-the accused sought the restoration of the Father: "He killed
the person who, in the concrete life of his family, represented the
transgression of the taboos and the principle of differentiation. This
was the tragedy in which Lortie, at the cost of his own life and that of
his unfortunate victims, sought to found himself and to live. This was
in short a genealogical crime. "81 There was, in other words, no order
of meaning, of names or places, into which Lortie could be inscribed.
There was no law to recognise and no law to observe. If such was true
at the fantasmatic level of the subject, it was equally true at the level
of the social enactment of Lortie's parricidal desire.
The failure of meaning which characterised Lortie's biography
and his crime can serve to draw attention to a second order of
homology between psyche and law. The two instances of the subject
share the fact and the sociality of language and gain their expression
and their representation through speech and through writing. The
psychic text and the legal text are comparable objects of interpretation
78
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and, by virtue of the commonality of language, belong to the same
institutional order of meaning. One could hazard that the law speaks
as if it were a subject, while the subject speaks as if it were a law.
Language, in other words, is irremediably social, a fact which
necessarily engages the psychoanalyst in the juristic enterprise of
interpretation and more broadly in the tragedy of the dogmatic
institution of life: "What does it mean to communicate? The reference
to law suggests a wide-ranging response: law communicates orders.
And yet normativity cannot be reduced to a mere play of appearances,
it mobilises a much more subtle set of human relations. Communicatio
is a substantive derived from communis. In other words, normative
communication implies making things common, making something
common which must not remain private. "82 Because the subject
speaks and because the subject's speech must be interpreted, language
implicates the psyche in the institutional order of reproduction, in the
genealogical relay that is law for us.
The case of Lortie also allows the specification of a further site of
commonality between psychoanalysis and law. It is that of the fantasm
and of the image as the vehicles of subjective attachment. The order
of law is a theatre of truth. The institution is built upon fictions,
represented through images, repeated through rituals and elaborated
through the simulated categories of a collective subject or will. The
age-old war of texts is complemented and at times exceeded by the war
of images. Law relies upon images because it is through images that
the legal subject is most directly affected by law. The power and hence
also the danger of the image was the primary force that motivated the
various movements of reform and counter reform within ecclesiastical
history. The image was politically effective but also potentially
corrupting; too great a love of images (latria) would distract the subject
from the dictates oflaw, while an absence of images would deprive the
law of subjects. Thus the concern of lawyers to govern images and to
regulate the social forms of representation, the theatre and the ritual
of government and of law. 83 The image is cognate with the imaginary
and it is through the image that law is most directly linked to the
mechanisms of subjective attachment or to the direction of individual
desire. The case of Lortie is a case of the failure of the ius imaginum,
of the representation of the order of successsion. Lortie had no
legitimate identity because he had no image with which to identify, no
imaginary space within which to found his own project, and hence he
82
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felt the need to kill an external father-a bad father-so as to make
room for a good father within.
The theatre of law, the images, symbols and rites around which
law is identified and reproduced, are also domains of attachment or
subjects of love. The role of the image in the imaginary is to incite
attachment and to focus desire or love upon circumscribed social
objects of affection or legitimate political sites. The structure of social
love is one of the great enigmas of political power and one of the most
opaque of the features of the history oflaw. The proximity of the image
to enigma deserves a parting word. The project of a psychoanalytic
jurisprudence is linked to a desire to understand more and not less
about law. In Legendre's depiction, it could be said to belong to a
venerable scholastic project concerned with the pursuit of an
impossible knowledge: "the celebrated interrogation {ides querens
intellectum, word for word, faith in search of understanding, faith in
search of intelligibility."u The conjunction of desire and law, of love
and power, is not only a fertile ground for understanding the
mechanics of law's governance of the subject and so its inscription
upon the soul. It is also potentially the site of the recovery of law's
difference. The case of Lortie can remind us that in the most tragic of
senses a subject without images, a subject who cannot see himself, is
a subject without identity and so without any consciousness of law.
More than that, a psychoanalytic reading of the history oflaw can also
remind modernity of the unconscious significance or latent meanings
of law. The poetics of legal texts, the art of justice and more broadly
the aesthetics of legal order are all parts of a history of resistance to
a unitary or positivised and closed order of legality. Legendre reminds
us that poetry and the poetics of the text signaled amongst other
things "the insurrection of desire against the institution. ml5 Poetry
and in varying degrees the other legal arts, painting and music in
particular, suggest a history and an erotics which wrote against power
and implied the possibility of using or interpreting law to other ends.
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